The land available for African use was now 28 591 606 acres or 29.8
percent for a population estimated at 1 081 000 in 1930. At the same
time a European settler population of about 50 00 was allocated 51
percent of the best land. The agricultural economy of the Shona and
Ndebele had been reduced to subsistence levels by the late 1930’s. A
significant reduction in the variety of crops grown was witnessed
accompanied by very low volumes in trade involving black people.
This is in contrast to historical accounts of the pre-colonial and
early postcolonial Zimbabwe, which portray a prosperous region with
agriculture as its mainstay.
A further wave of new European settlers escaping from post Second
World War economic hardships in Europe resulted in the phenomenal
rise in white population form 80 500 in 1945 to 219 000 by 1960.
Although some of the new settlers took up white-collar jobs in the
cities, many took up farming. As a result, the numbers of Europeans
working or owning farms almost doubled from 4 673 in 1945 to 8 632
in 1960. To make way for these new immigrants, recourse was had to
the now entrenched policy of wholesale evictions and forced removals
of black communities. In the decade 1945-55 at least 100 000 people
were forcibly moved into the Reserves, some of which were located in
the inhospitable and tsetse-ridden areas such as Gokwe and
Muzarabani.
Blaming this state of affairs on alleged African malpractices, the
colonial Government enacted the Native Land Husbandry Act in 1951.
The provisions were primarily aimed at enforcing de-stocking and
conservation practices on black held land. The policy of segregation
had led to severe overcrowding and land degradation in the Reserves,
a situation confirmed by in 1959 a former Land Development Officer
in the Native Agriculture Department, one Ken Brown, in “Land in
Southern Rhodesia, that:
The majority of arable areas in reserves are
already so eroded and so exhausted of fertility that nothing short
of a 12 to 15 year rest to grass will restore them to a state of
structure and fertility which would enable economic crop production
to commence.
The state of the degradation in the so called Native Reserve was
further confirmed when the then Catholic Bishop of Umtali, Donal
Lamont, asked in June 1959 that:
Can you in conscience blame the Africa, if eking
out tenuous existence from the poor soil in an overcrowded Reserve,
he is swayed by subversive propaganda, while close besides him there
lie hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile soil which he may
not cultivate, not occupy, not grace, because although it lies
unused and unattended, it belongs to some individuals or group of
individuals who perhaps do not use the land in the hope of profit
from speculation.
With the coming into power of the Rhodesian From in t 1962, any
pretence at accommodating blacks was abandoned. Segregation would
henceforth be pursued with increasing vigour. This process
culminated in the 1969 Land Tenure Act, which, while repealing the
Land Appointment Act, re-enacted and strengthened its provisions by
dividing the land in half with 44.9 million acres allocated to each
race. The policy was entrenched in a new constitution. These
measures led to further overstocking, very high population
densities, serious environmental damage, reduced agricultural
productivity and poverty in the communal areas. Overcrowding led
many people to settle on riverbanks, steep slopes, grazing areas and
fragile land, posing great environmental risks.
It is therefore against this background that land ranked highest
among the grievances that motivated the indigenous black majority to
launch the Second Chimurenga/Imfazwe to free the country from
colonial oppression. It is worthy of not that in the period
preceding the liberation war, “mwana wevhu/umntwana womhlabati”
(child of the soil) became the nationalists’ rallying call. Herbert
Chitepo, Chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
party, put it succinctly when he said:
I could go into the whole theories of
discrimination in legislation, in legislation, in residency, in
economic opportunities, in education. I could go into that, but I
will restrict myself to the question of land because I think this is
very basic. To us the essence of exploitation, the essence of white
domination, is domination over land. That is the real issue.
(Herbert Chitepo: Speech on a trip to Australia
in 1973)
The land issue was inevitably central to any initiatives aimed at
resolving the crisis in Rhodesia. It was a major stumbling block in
all pre-independence negotiations initiatives, including those held
in Geneva (1976), and Malta (1978). In 1977 Lord Owen and Andrew
Young, then British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and US
Ambassador to the United Nations respectively, proposed the
“Anglo-American Proposals”, under which their Governments pledged to
contribute towards a fund for land reform, including paying
compensation to white farmers whose land holding would be
redistributed to landless blacks.
The near collapse of the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 revolved
around the land question. The Patriotic Front’s position at the
Lancaster House negotiations was that the raison d’etre of
the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was the recovery of land of
which the people had been dispossessed. It was put to those involved
in the talks, that the dispossession without compensation was not a
thing of the distant past, but rather an occurrence still within the
memories of living people. Further arguing its case, the PF objected
to British provisions in the draft Bill of Rights which sought to
convert the freedom from deprivation of property into a right to
retain privilege and perpetuate injustice whilst upholding the
status quo.
(Partial record of the
Lancaster
House negotiations).
The pledge by the British Government, supported by the US
Government, to support the new political dispensation by agreeing to
the settling up of a fund to finance land reform in a new Zimbabwe
broke the impasse at the constitutional talks. Former Commonwealth
Secretary General, Sir Shridath Ramphal, in 2002 in an interview on
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) “Hard Talk” programme
highlights this fact. In that interview Sir Shridath states that he
had “Intervened through the American Government.” That
intervention secured assurances for the PF to resume talks and
accept the British constitutional proposals. He added, “the
American Ambassador, Mr. K. Brewster, with the support of Cyrus
Vance, the Secretary of Stat, persuaded the President who was Jimmy
Carter to make an offer of US assistance in conjunction with other
countries including Britain”. In its announcement of the
agreement that was finally reached, the PD said:
We have now obtained assurances that … Britain,
the United States of America and other countries will participate in
a multinational donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and
economic development programmes. These assurances go a long way in
allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question
arising from the great need our people have for land and our
commitment to satisfy that need when in Government
(Partial record of the
Lancaster House negotiations)
Chairman of the Lancaster House Conference, Lord Carrington
acknowledged the centrality of the land issue and the enormity of
the resources needed to redress the colonial legacy, in a statement
issued on 11th October 1979:
We recognise that the future of Zimbabwe,
whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land
ownership. The costs would be very substantial indeed, well beyond
the capacity, in our judgement, of any individual donor country and
the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a
specific share in them. We should however be ready to support the
efforts of the Government of Independent Zimbabwe to obtain
international assistance for these purposes.
(Partial record of the
Lancaster House negotiations)
Yet the final agreement did not address the land problem adequately;
the PF accepted it on the understanding that the UK, the USA and
other donor nations would pay for land needed for resettlement.
The then President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, during a press
conference on 16th October 1979, opined over the land
issue would be impossible for an independent Government in
Zimbabwe.
To tax Zimbabweans in order to compensate people
who took it away from them through the gun. Really the British
cannot have it both ways. They made this an issue and they are now
making vague remarks mixing rural development aid with the question
of land compensation … The two are separate … The British paid money
to Kenya. That the future Government of Zimbabwe must pay
compensation is a British demand and the British must promise in
London to make the money available.
As part of the Declaration of Rights, the British inserted Section
16 of the Draft Constitution which sought to prohibit the compulsory
acquisition of property of any description except under the
authority of law which required the acquiring authority to give
reasonable notice of its intention to acquire the property in
question. The property could only be acquired in the interest of
defence, public order, public morality, public health, and town and
country planning. In the event of compulsory acquisition, the
acquiring authority would be required to pay prompt and adequate
compensation. As part of the Declaration of Rights, section 16 would
be entrenched for a period of 10 years from the date of
independence. During this period any amendment to the Constitution
would be on the basis of a 100% parliamentary vote (i.e. every
Member of Parliament supporting any such amendment).
In response to this attempts to perpetuate the stats quo on land
ownership,
the patriotic front (PF) objected vehemently to the
restrictions imposed on land acquisition. It argued that such
entrenchment of the Declaration of Rights, was unduly restrictive of
the sovereignty of the parliament of Zimbabwe and that it granted a
veto to the minority, contrary to democratic norms and in
contradiction to the basic objective of the national liberation
struggle itself. Furthermore, the concept of willing buyer precluded
the possibility of a planned and systematic process of land reform
in the country.
At the independence in 1980 the agricultural sector comprised three
sub-sectors. The large-scale commercial farming sub-sector of 6,000
white farmers, owned 15.5 million hectares, more than half of which
lay in the high rainfall agro- ecological regions where the
potential for agricultural production is greatest. On the other hand
was the small-scale commercial farming sub-sector comprising 8,500
black farmers who held 1.4 million hectares of agricultural land
located mostly in the drier agro-ecological regions. Finally the
communal areas, inhabited by the bulk of the populace of 4.3
millions people worked 16.4 million hectare of agricultural land, 75
percent of which was located in the drier agro- ecological regions
where the soils are also poor . White commercial agriculture was
typically characterised by a lot of land that was unutilised or
underutilised, held by absentee landlords or just left derelict for
speculative purposes.
Land Distribution in 1980
Diagram
Source: Government of Zimbabwe Land Reform and Resettlement
Programme Revised Phase II
Clearly the history of colonialism in Zimbabwe had been largely a
story in which Europeans had used their control over land to secure
for themselves a position of economic and political dominance. No
black Government could be expected to uphold this racially skewed
land structure.
Addressing the Catholic IMBISA Plenary Assembly in Harare, on 30
July 2001, President R.G. Mugabe described the situation obtaining
in the country, which however was no different to that at
pre-independence, thus:
As in the past, the basis of conflict in
contemporary Zimbabwe is the unresolved national question of land.
It is also the basis of peace and all other rights that we wish for
in a democracy. Its solutions would enable us to end the two-nation,
two-race model we inherited from colonialism. It would create
opportunities for everyone and give a stake to the majority of our
people; indeed it is the way to the recovery of our economy. This is
why Land Reform is at the heart of the current struggle. We cannot
relent on this one and we hope the Church will stand with and by us
in resolving it.
3. Context, Policy And Thrust Of The Fast Track Land
And Agrarian Reform Programme July 2000-August 2002
At independence, the Government of Zimbabwe sought to redress the
inherited colonial legacy of glaring and skewed racial inequalities
in land distribution. Yet, between 1980 and 1990 Government managed
to acquire only 3.5 million hectares and resettled 71,000
households. The communal areas still remained congested, overstocked
and overgrazed. Pressure was mounting on Government to accelerate
its land reform programme.
Under the Lancaster House Constitutional provisions, no meaningful
land reform programme could take place. The Constitution obligated
Government to acquire land on a willing seller-willing buyer basis
during the first ten years of independence. Where land was offered
to Government, in most cases it was expensive, marginal and occurred
in pockets around the country, making it difficult to effect a
systematic and managed land reform. Moreover, land supply failed to
match the demand for land resettlement. Added to these complicating
factors was the absence of international support to fund land
acquisition.
The composition of Parliament at the time of 80 Common Roll seats
for blacks and 20 whites made any constitution amendment virtually
impossible. The diametrically opposed political imperatives for the
victorious black Government and the defeated white opposition
minority made the possibility of any far-reaching amendment an
impossible feat.
In a bid to speed up the process of land acquisition and
resettlement, Government passed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992,
following the introduction in 1990 of Constitutional Amendment 11.
These legal instruments had the effect of freeing Government from
the willing seller/willing buyer clause. The process however
remained slow, cumbersome and expensive largely because of the
commercial farmers’ resistance. For example, when Government
designated 1471 farms for compulsory acquisition in December 1997 a
total of 1393 objections were received of which 510 were upheld. The
exclusions were farms either owned by indigenous black people,
Churches, or plantation farms, or those with Zimbabwe Investment
Centre permits and single owner farms being used productively. For
the remaining 883 farms Government had to go through lengthy
judicial processes. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) representing
white farmers was opposed to meaningful land redistribution. Remarks
by the late Vice President Cde J.M. Nkomo to a gathering of the CFU
are instructive.
I don’t think we are being unreasonable if we say
you commercial farmers, who own the best and the bulk of Zimbabwe’s
land because of history, should share part of it with the
indigenous, displaced and landless blacks who are the majority.
(Joshua Nkomo: addressing Commercial farmers
in Matabeleland: Sunday Mail 9 July, 1989)
The British Conservative Government under John Major had agreed to
assist with further funding for land reform, in 1996. However, with
the coming to power of Tony Blair’s Labour Government in 1997
matters came to a head. The Labour Government refused to advance the
process of land reform, in effect revoking Britain’s obligations as
per the Lancaster House understanding. In a letter to the Zimbabwean
Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Kumbirai Kangai, then Secretary of
State for International Development, Ms Claire Short stated thus:
I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a
special responsibility to meet the costs of Land purchase in
Zimbabwe. We are a new Government from diverse backgrounds without
links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as
you know we were colonised not colonisers
This unprecedented stance by the British Government marked the
beginning of worsening relations between the two Governments. No
further funds were made available to Zimbabwe’s land reform
programme
Disappointed at the pace of land redistribution, the people
responded, bringing pressure to bear on Government by resorting to
vigorous protests and land occupations. In an unprecedented move,
villagers in Svosve communal areas in June 1998 occupied Igava farm
vowing to stay on until Government had made a written undertaking to
resettle them. The villagers cited poor soils and congestion as
factors that had compelled them to occupy white farms contiguous to
the villages. Similar and widespread occupations of white commercial
farms followed in Nyamandhlovu in Matabeleland, Nyamajura in
Manicaland and Nemamwa in Masvingo. The villagers reluctantly
complied with the Government’s order for withdrawal form the
occupied farms. The first salvo by a land hungry and increasingly
restless peasantry had however been fired. More was to follow.
Sir Shidath’s response in the already cited BBC
programme gives context to this turn of events. Asked whether
Zimbabweans “were let down by the British” he said, “Britain let
them down. Britain did not fulfil its promises and they found all
sorts of ways to wriggle out and that was very unfortunate and that
it is what had led to some of the bitterness …”
Overtures from the international community
The desire for an all-inclusive collaboration in addressing the land
issue saw the Government of Zimbabwe engaging the international
donor community and other interested parties. Contact was
established with the European Union (EU) and other donors under the
auspices of the UN. Talks between President Mugabe and the EU
Commissioner for Development, Mr. Joao Pinheiro in January 1998
culminated in the hosting of the 9 to 11 September 1998 Land Donor
Conference in Harare. In his inaugural address to the Land Donor
Conference, President Mugabe highlighted the growing impatience of
black Zimbabweans over the slow pace of land reform and warned
that:
If we delay in resolving the land needs of our
people, they will resettle themselves. It has happened before and it
may happen again.
This was not a self-fulfilling prophecy, but a description of
reality of what had already happened. The Svosve case mentioned
above being but one illustration.
Represented at the conference were 48 countries (including Britain)
and some international organisations. Basic principles and the
framework for international assistance for the Land Reform Programme
were agreed upon. To this end, a task force of major donors was to
be established to work out the modalities for a two-year Inception
Phase, the precursor of Phase II of a donor supported land
acquisition and resettlement programme. During this period, several
alternative approaches to land redistribution would be tested and
tried on 118 farms on offer. However, Britain refused to join the
task force, but instead insisted that a consulting firm undertake an
initial economic returns analysis of the programme and assess how
far it would alleviate poverty among the poor in Zimbabwe. These
dilatory tactics effectively killed the Inception Phase in its
tracks.
In September 2000, President Mugabe met the UN Secretary General,
Kofi Annan in New York and discussed the land issue in Zimbabwe and
a possible role for the UN. A Technical Mission to Zimbabwe under
the aegis of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was
despatched in October that year. The mission was mandated to carry
out a technical review into measures necessary for a “sound
technical process to take the land reform forward.”
The UNDP Technical Mission conceded that while a framework for the
legal and administrative process for compulsory acquisition of land
through the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 was in place, Government
had failed to acquired that land principally on account of technical
and administrative considerations arising from legal challenges
launched by white commercial farmers.
As a follow up to the UNDP Technical Mission and the subsequent
visit of its Administrator, Mr. Mark Brown in December 2000, written
communication was exchanged with the Government. Through this
medium, Government was given the assurance that the UN Secretary
General’s consultations with President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa
and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and other regional leaders as well
as key western donors, including the World Bank, gave him confidence
that the UNDP could generate the requisite support for the Land
Reform Programme. However, as was previously the case,
conditionalities were placed on Government once more. The Secretary
General could only persuade the donor community to come on board
once “outstanding law and order issues are being brought under
control.” Government was therefore requested to make a choice
between continuing with its Fast Track Land Reform Programme and
adopting “a more systematic, investment-backed approach,” which the
UN supported. In the letter, Mr. Brown conceded that the second
approach entailed a slow start and the delay of resettlement until
confidence-building measures were put in place to secure a
resumption of donor funding.
Government through the Foreign Minister, Dr. I.S.G. Mudenge,
responded in March 2001 to Mr. Brown agreeing with most of his
proposals. It however rejected the second approach, which would have
entailed the abandonment of the Fast Track. It was also put to Mr.
Brown that if the donor community had responded timeously with the
required resources to implement the agreement reached at the 1998
Land Donor Conference, and, had the commercial farmers not resorted
to legal actions aimed at frustrating the Land Resettlement
Programme, significant progress could have been achieved by that
time. Government indicated that a unique opportunity had been
missed.
It is worth noting that while expressing disquiet over unrelated
political questions and conditionalities from some donors,
Government accepted the following proposals submitted by Mr. Brown:
